#Moduloft

Guten Tag, here is your unroll: @rld_real_CPR: In the manner of the Hymn numbers posted for the order of service. The Perfect Storm and Dr Tim Morgans… https://t.co/khjuMaqgxm Share this if you think it's interesting. ?

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In the manner of the Hymn numbers posted for the order of service. The Perfect Storm and Dr Tim Morgans Surplus Energy Economics Blog. #155 #GrubStreetJournal @Wiki_Ballot https://t.co/Jf6buX3LZD via @rld_real_CPR

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December 2015 The Bank of England’s approach to setting a minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) Consultation on a proposed Statement of Policy Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England said: “The implementation of MREL is a crucial step forward in ensuring that any bank, large or small, carries sufficient resources to be resolved in an orderly way, without recourse to public subsidy and without disruption to the wider financial system.” MREL can be satisfied by a combination of regulatory capital and certain long term unsecured debt resources. For firms that have a bail-in strategy, resources satisfying MREL requirements must be subordinate to operating liabilities of the firm. MREL is the sum of two components: a loss absorption amount: to cover losses up to and in resolution; and a recapitalisation amount: to enable the firm (or parts of it) to continue to meet conditions for authorisation and maintain market confidence as necessary following resolution. The Bank will base the loss absorption component of MREL on the minimum going-concern capital requirement set by the PRA (or FCA for firms regulated solely by the FCA). Currently, this comprises Pillar 1 (the minimum capital requirement that firms must meet at all times to comply with the Capital Requirements Regulation) plus Pillar 2A, which covers risks not captured or not adequately captured in Pillar 1, or any applicable leverage ratio if that is higher. The recapitalisation component will be based on a firm’s recapitalisation needs post resolution as determined by the PRA as the supervisory authority and any additional requirements necessary to maintain market confidence. The recapitalisation component can be satisfied with capital maintained in excess of the loss absorption amount or qualifying unsecured debt instruments with a maturity of above 1 year. The Bank will set MREL on a firm-specific basis, depending on the resolution strategy for the firm. The Bank intends to take a proportionate approach, with the strategy driven by a range of factors, including a firm’s size, the scale of its critical economic functions and the complexity of transferring these activities in resolution. For firms which need a bail-in strategy to continue operating, the recapitalisation amount is likely to be at least equal to existing Pillar 1 plus Pillar 2A capital requirements. For firms for which part of the business could be transferred to a private sector purchaser or temporarily to a bridge bank in resolution, the Bank proposes to set a recapitalisation amount that may be lower than existing Pillar 1 plus Pillar 2A capital requirements. For firms which can be placed into insolvency their recapitalisation needs will be zero. Actual and indicative minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) Notes 1. Total Capital Requirements (TCRs) in the Tables are as at December 2018. For firms whose binding minimum TCR is based on risk-weighted assets (RWAs), the Table contains each firm's Pillar 1 and Pillar 2A requirements expressed as a percentage of the firm's RWAs. Where otherwise specified, for firms with a leverage-based binding minimum TCR, the Table contains each firm's Requirement expressed as a percentage of the total value of the firm's leverage exposures (LEs). 2. Individual external ‘Minimum Requirements for own funds and Eligible Liabilities’ (MRELs) are based on balance sheet data as at December 2018. For firms whose binding MREL is based on RWAs, the Table shows each firm's MRELs expressed as a percentage of the firm's RWAs. For firms with a leverage-based binding MREL, the Table contain each firm's MREL expressed as a percentage of the total value of the firm's leverage exposures. MRELs expressed as a percentage of LEs are given to the nearest 0.05% to align the number of decimal places with the leverage- based TCR. 3. The buffers included in the Table comprise: a. A capital conservation buffer of 2.5%; b. Financial Stability Board (FSB) global systemically important bank (G-SIB) buffers based on the FSB’s 2018 list of G-SIBs1 ; c. A firm-specific countercyclical capital buffer, estimated by assuming that a 1% countercyclical capital buffer applies in the UK and a 0% countercyclical capital buffer applies in all other jurisdictions (to avoid disclosing where other jurisdictions have positive countercyclical buffer values); and d. The systemic risk buffer, in line with the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA)’s published approach2 and rates3 . The buffers in the Table do not include the PRA buffer, the size of which is firm-specific and confidential. Firms whose binding TCRs are leverage-based are not subject to the capital conservation buffer. The calculation of firms’ combined buffers above MREL is in line with PRA Supervisory Statement 16/16(4)4, where appropriate. 4. The indicative MRELs for 2020-2022 set out in the Tables should not be construed as binding, nor are they a definitive indication of future MRELs. The MREL set for a specific firm in any given year will ultimately depend on a number of factors including, but not limited to: a. Changes to the firm and its balance sheet; b. The Bank’s preferred resolution strategy for the firm (which must be reviewed annually); c. An assessment of the concerns regarding the resolvability of the firm, including the progress of the firm in achieving resolvability; d. Decisions made by resolution colleges and crisis management groups; and e. Future changes in Bank, PRA or international policy, or in the applicable legal regime, which change the way MREL or capital requirements are calculated. Actual MRELs will require consultation with competent authorities and relevant European Union resolution authorities. 5. Since 1 January 2019, UK resolution entities that are G-SIBs5 have been required to meet the minimum requirements set out in the FSB’s Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Standard6 , as implemented through the Bank’s Statement of Policy on MREL7 (the MREL SoP) in the UK, being the higher of 16% of RWAs on a consolidated basis or 6% leverage exposures on a consolidated basis. The FSB’s TLAC requirements, as implemented in the EU by the amended Capital Requirements Regulation (CRRII)8 came into force on 27 June 2019. These set different calculations of leverage requirements for G-SIBs than those set out in the MREL SoP. G-SIBs are required to meet both requirements and will be bound by the higher of either requirement. Where the binding MREL is the leverage-based requirement under the MREL SoP, it is calculated based on the Financial Policy Committee’s (FPC’s) definition of the total exposure measure as set out in the Bank’s Policy Statement on the FPC’s powers over leverage ratio tools, as updated in October 20179 . Where the binding MREL is the leverage-based requirement under CRRII, it is calculated based on the total exposure measure set out in Article 429(4) of the Capital Requirements Regulation, as amended by CRRII. While this publication includes the CRRII requirements specifically referred to above, it does not include assumptions about the future application of other changes that may result from the revision of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and CRR. The Bank is committed to, before the end of 2020, reviewing the calibration of MREL, and the final compliance date, prior to setting end-state MRELs. In doing so, the Bank will have regard to any intervening changes in the UK regulatory Prudential Regulation Authority (United Kingdom) SONIA (interest rate) History SONIA was launched in March 1997 by WMBA Limited, and is endorsed by the British Bankers Association (BBA).[2] The Bank of England took on administration of rate in April 2016. Two years later, in April 2018, the rate underwent a number of reforms.[1] In the same year efforts to promote SONIA as the standard Sterling interest rate benchmark for loans, derivatives and bonds were stepped up.[3][4] In July 2019, UK transport group National Express obtained the first corporate loan referencing SONIA. The loan was drawn from NatWest as part of a pilot scheme before launch into the wider market.[5] Technical details On each London business day, SONIA is measured as the trimmed mean, rounded to four decimal places, of interest rates paid on eligible sterling denominated deposit transactions. The trimmed mean is calculated as the volume-weighted mean rate, based on the central 50% of the volume-weighted distribution of rates.[6] Eligible transactions are[6]: reported to the Bank’s Sterling Money Market daily data collection, in accordance with the effective version of the ‘Reporting Instructions for Form SMMD’; unsecured and of one business day maturity; executed between 00:00 hours and 18:00 hours UK time and settled that same-day; and greater than or equal to £25 million in value. The rate conventions are: annualised rate, act/365, four decimal places.[7] In 2018, SONIA (floating rate) bonds accounted for 20.7 per cent share of UK issuance compared to 48.1 per cent share of Interbank Offered Rate (floating rate) bonds.[citation needed] Libor The London Inter-bank Offered Rate For the Libor manipulation scandal, see Libor scandal. For the personal name, see Libor (name). Libor gets its name from the City of London. The London Inter-bank Offered Rate is an interest-rate average calculated from estimates submitted by the leading banks in London. Each bank estimates what it would be charged were it to borrow from other banks.[1][a] The resulting rate is usually abbreviated to Libor (/ˈlaɪbɔːr/) or LIBOR, or more officially to ICE LIBOR (for Intercontinental Exchange Libor). It was formerly known as BBA Libor (for British Bankers' Association Libor or the trademark bba libor) before the responsibility for the administration was transferred to Intercontinental Exchange. It is the primary benchmark, along with the Euribor, for short-term interest rates around the world.[2][3] However, Libor will not be published any more after end-2021, and market participants are strongly encouraged to transition to other risk-free rates.[4][5] Libor rates are calculated for five currencies and seven borrowing periods ranging from overnight to one year and are published each business day by Thomson Reuters.[6] Many financial institutions, mortgage lenders, and credit card agencies set their own rates relative to it. At least $350 trillion in derivatives and other financial products are tied to Libor.[7] Market transition from LIBOR to SONIA Interbank lending market From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigationJump to search The interbank lending market is a market in which banks lend funds to one another for a specified term. Most interbank loans are for maturities of one week or less, the majority being over day. Such loans are made at the interbank rate (also called the overnight rate if the term of the loan is overnight). A sharp decline in transaction volume in this market was a major contributing factor to the collapse of several financial institutions during the financial crisis of 2007–2008. Banks are required to hold an adequate amount of liquid assets, such as cash, to manage any potential bank runs by customers. If a bank cannot meet these liquidity requirements, it will borrow money in the interbank market to cover the shortfall. Some banks, on the other hand, have excess liquid assets above and beyond the liquidity requirements, and will lend money in the interbank market, receiving interest on such loans. The interbank rate is the rate of interest charged on short-term loans between banks. Banks borrow and lend money in the interbank lending market in order to manage liquidity and satisfy regulations such as reserve requirements. The interest rate charged depends on the availability of money in the market, on prevailing rates and on the specific terms of the contract, such as term length. There is a wide range of published interbank rates, including the federal funds rate (USA), the LIBOR (UK) and the Euribor (Eurozone). https://www.fooledbyrandomness.com/tenprinciples.pdf http://teawithft.blogspot.com/ Stylized fact In social sciences, especially economics, a stylized fact is a simplified presentation of an empirical finding.[1] A stylized fact is often a broad generalization that summarizes data, which although essentially true may have inaccuracies in the detail. A prominent example of a stylized fact is: "Education significantly raises lifetime income." Another stylized fact in economics is: "In advanced economies, real GDP growth fluctuates in a recurrent but irregular fashion". However, scrutiny to detail will often produce counterexamples. In the case given above, holding a PhD may lower lifetime income, because of the years of lost earnings it implies and because many PhD holders enter academia instead of higher-paid fields. Nonetheless, broadly speaking, people with more education tend to earn more, so the above example is true in the sense of a stylized fact. List of acronyms associated with the eurozone crisis https://whenthecrisishitthefan.wordpress.com/2012/01/24/the-irony-of-reading-plutarch/

Ariadnes Ball of String. Back to Golem. To Whom do we owe this Money? StrudyBlog, Golem, The Slog, Robin Smith. Dr Adrian Wriggley #RichardWerner https://t.co/1kcxdcHxUh via @rld_real_CPR

— RealRLD (@rld_real_CPR) December 18, 2020

To Whom Do We Owe This Money, Exactly? My Debt to Sturdy Blog and Golem XIV. Motley Fool, Cliff Darcy- The Spirit Level. Golem XIV, Positive Money- The Grub Street Journal and #Conquestof Dough https://t.co/5dqi7uaws8 via @rld_real_CPR

— RealRLD (@rld_real_CPR) December 18, 2020

https://issuu.com/corporatewatch/docs/corporate_watch_false_dilemmas_guid

Bricks Without Straw. Pharoh Merkel https://t.co/DlQEvIg47Q via @rld_real_CPR

— RealRLD (@rld_real_CPR) December 18, 2020

Meet The Fuggers, Brexit, The Euro and Clueless Elites. https://t.co/NuWR4tBaQD via @rld_real_CPR

— RealRLD (@rld_real_CPR) December 18, 2020

#Tautology #CircularReasoning #RobbingPetertoPayPaul #MoneyisanAbstractRatio #CentralBankCoup #COP26 #ReithLectures #BraveNewWorldofCarbonTrading #SPASH #WrongKindofGreen #MODULOFT #AffordableHomes #CreditMisallocation #EphorsofDebt #EuroCrisis #Brexit #CronyCapitalistVirus

Government Bond Markets Aren't "Free" Markets https://t.co/sKnDTGbHSV via @cullenroche

— RealRLD (@rld_real_CPR) December 18, 2020

The Biggest Myths in Economics https://t.co/qTx5DpD2sU via @cullenroche

— RealRLD (@rld_real_CPR) December 18, 2020

To Be Continued this is a Notebook Post , as have so many of my posts been this past two months.

Brian Rose's Real Deal - London's Housing Crisis Is Threatening Our Capital's Future - Our Mayor Has Failed In His Promises To Build Affordable Homes For Our Citizens - London Real https://t.co/3uLxLqmsyb

— RealRLD (@rld_real_CPR) December 17, 2020

Hello Brian, I have watched the Modular Housing and Affordable Housing Video downloads. #Moduloft is a Company I have started to tackle this problem. The Solution is one of Ownership versus Tenancy both related to disposable income and also Finance. Finance for Build to Rent has not been a problem, Finance for Owner occupation Mortgages (somewhat of a problem). The Delivery Path for housing is also one of several bureaucratic Layers. The GLE / Mayoral Level being but one. If you would like to discuss the Policy framework affecting this question at all levels feel free to call me. https://notthegrubstreetjournal.com/2020/12/16/moduloft-the-affordable-housing-manufacturers-defining-the-terms-of-and-boundary-conditions-of-our-domain-2/ Sadiq Khan is shining a light in all the wrong areas, Don't make the same mistake. The problem remains unsolved, This is absurd, its not rocket science. When something such as the current problem emerges across several decades and actually gets worse it is not because policy makers are stupid , it is that other less popular policies are given precedence. Believe it or not to see what the Policy areas are for this , One has to look at the Covered Bond markets, and the concepts of Land Value Capture ( Community Infrastructure Levy) . Good luck with your campaign, you are very much in danger of Over promising here on Timescales, I question how wise that is. I have published a series of Primer/Readers on the areas effecting these questions. Mine are Free Market solutions and for profit I achieve this by placing my Customers First Time Buyers and Starter Home purchasers first.

https://t.co/lrgUd5ZAgB via @yumpu_com

— RealRLD (@rld_real_CPR) December 15, 2020

http://www.realrld.com/blog/placemaking-basics-by-for-and-of-the-people-basics-by-realrld-coming-soon-our-requirements-and-approach Rent Seekers or Placemakers? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_George

The outstanding value of all residential mortgage loans was £1,527.3 billion at the end of 2020 Q3

two thirds of households own the house they live in; half of these are still paying off their mortgage

28,536,000 Dwellings

29,180,071,800 sq ft 29 Billion Sqft .

The effectiveness of any Model is determined by a number of factors, Integrity of the data, and what scientist/modelers call defining the extent of the models domain, what we might call Parameters or Boundary conditions. To understand "The Housing Market" and make contributions to it a good place to start is How Big is it and what are its constituent parts. What is it. What is the housing market? When people buy or sell houses, either to live in or as an investment, we refer to this as the housing market. A house is the most valuable thing many people will ever own. In Britain, two thirds of households own the house they live in; half of these are still paying off their mortgage. The remaining third of households are renters, split fairly equally between private and social renting.( Source. Bank of England. ) How Big is It Physically. (Source: Building Research Establishment.) From the above table of 2017 Data In the United Kingdom there were 28,536,000 Dwellings with an average Dwelling size of 95SQM or 2,710,920,000 sqm or Errors pp 56/57 28,536,000 dewellings x 95sqm= 2,710,920,000 Sqm 29,180,071,800 sq ft 29 Billion Sqft UK Housing Stock Total

29,180,071,800 sq ft 29 Billion Sqft .

Plot Size and Dwelling Size How do we Value it? Median House Price to Income Ratios. From Fixing our Broken Housing Market 2017, Sajid David.( Ex Deutsche Bank) The FCA and the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) both have responsibility for the regulation of mortgage lenders and administrators. We jointly publish the mortgage lending statistics every quarter. Since the beginning of 2007, around 340 regulated mortgage lenders and administrators have been required to submit a Mortgage Lending and Administration Return (MLAR) each quarter, providing data on their mortgage lending activities. Key findings The outstanding value of all residential mortgage loans was £1,527.3 billion at the end of 2020, 2.9% higher than a year earlier (Table A). The value of gross mortgage advances in 2020 Q3 was £62.5 billion, 14.7% lower than in 2019 Q3 (Table A and Chart 1). The value of new mortgage commitments (lending agreed to be advanced in the coming months) was 6.8% higher than a year earlier, at £78.9 billion and the highest level since 2007 Q3 (Table A and Chart 1). The share of gross advances with interest rates less than 2% above Bank Rate was 74.2% in 2020 Q3, 10.0 percentage points (pp) lower than a year ago (Chart 2). See the Bank’s data on Effective Interest Rates. The share of mortgages advanced in 2020 Q3 with loan to value (LTV) ratios exceeding 90% was 3.5%, 2.4pp lower than a year earlier (Chart 3). The share of gross advances for remortgages for owner occupation was 25%, a decrease of 3pp since 2019 Q3. The share for house purchase for owner occupation was 55.8%, up 2.6pp from 2019 Q3. (Chart 5). The value of outstanding balances with some arrears fell by 1.2% over the quarter to £13.8 billion, and now accounts for 0.90% of outstanding mortgage balances (Chart 6). 2017-2018 2014 2013- https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/app/uploads/2020/01/An-outstanding-balance.pdf How are these Lending Decisions Made, and where does the Money Come from? https://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/working_papers/paper499.pdf

A second innovation is the theory-justified use of an estimate of the proportion of mortgages in negative equity, based on an average debt to equity ratio, as one of the key drivers of possessions and arrears.

Possessions and arrears are driven by three economic fundamentals: the debt service ratio; the proxy for the proportion of mortgages in negative equity, calibrated from an average debt to equity ratio; and the unemployment rate. Modelling the three equations as a system with common lending quality and policy shifts helps greatly in the identifying the unobservables. By sharp contrast with earlier UK literature, there is no significant effect on the rate of possessions from either measure of arrears. This important finding is discussed further below.

The long-run effects24 on the possessions rate are shown in Figure 7 for the debt-service ratio, estimated proportion in negative equity and the unemployment rate. Figure 8 shows the longrun impact of loan quality and forbearance policy, discussed further below. The figures suggest that in the first possessions crisis in 1989-93, the initial rise in possessions was driven mainly by the rise in the debt-service ratio, combined with lower loan quality, but later the rising incidence of negative equity emerged as an important driver. The persistence of negative equity prevented a faster decline in possessions, despite lower interest rates and the forbearance policy introduced at the end of 1991. In the second possessions crisis, the rise in possessions from its low level in 2004 again was caused by a growing debt-service ratio, and later the increasing incidence of negative equity, which rose sharply in 2008-9.

To illustrate the magnitudes implied by this research, a 10 percent increase in the debt-service ratio, for example due to the mortgage interest rate rising from 4 percent to 4.4 percent, is estimated eventually to raise the possessions rate by around 19 percent, and the 6 month arrears rate, corrected for measurement bias, by 15 percent. This calculation holds the proportion of mortgages in negative equity and the unemployment rate fixed. At 2009Q3 house price and debt levels, a fall in house prices of 1.4 percent would raise the proportion of mortgages with negative equity from an estimated 8.5 percent to 9.35 percent, a 10 percent proportionate increase. An increase of this magnitude in the rate of negative equity is estimated eventually to increase the possessions rate by 7 percent and the 6 month arrears rate by 3.5 percent. A ten percent increase in the unemployment rate from 8 percent to 8.8 percent is estimated to increase the possessions rate by 2 percent32 and the 6 month arrears rate by 10 percent.

The sustainability of these relatively benign conditions is questionable, however, given the 31 In late 2009 the spread between mortgage rates on new loans and base rate was close to 350 basis points, with base rates at 0.5%. It seems likely that the spread would narrow with base rates at 1.5 or 2 %. Also with slightly higher base rates and hence higher deposit rates, retail saving flows into banks are likely to improve, perhaps easing credit constraints on lending. 32 This estimate is less accurate than the others and the figure could well be as high as 4 percent. 32 funding gap between retail deposits in UK banks and their loan book33, the time-table of withdrawal of the Special Liquidity Scheme and the Credit Guarantee Scheme, and concerns over the UK‟s sovereign debt.

?, see Exploration of claimed link between Deposits and Bank Lending, in Werner Quantity Theory of Credit.???? ( otherwise this seems a very good paper!!!

Two UK government objectives are to improve housing affordability and to restore financial stability. Housing has become unaffordable for many younger people, perpetuating the inequality from the redistribution of housing wealth of the late 1990s to 2007, from potential first-time buyers to older and wealthier households. However, substantial falls in house prices, triggered by the removal of income support, higher interest rates and potentially by supply and demand side reforms34 , could increase negative equity and exacerbate the problem of bad banking loans. It would, however, be a mistake to take the risk of substantial falls in house prices as an excuse for not expanding residential land supply. For if reforms of the planning system and of incentives for local governments to expand the supply of residential building land were to increase the rate of future building, DCLG‟s housing affordability model and research done for the Barker review suggests that the effects on house prices would be felt only gradually. A further advantage in the short-run would be employment gains in the building industry at a time when the public sector will be shedding jobs. In the long-run, a more sustainable level of house prices relative to the financial capabilities of households should reduce the risk of new crises.

https://www.ftadviser.com/mortgages/2019/09/11/high-ltv-mortgages-spike-to-2008-level/

BoE data showed mortgages with LTVs higher than 90 per cent accounted for nearly 11 per cent of the market in the second quarter of 2007, but that had dropped to 2 per cent in the same quarter of 2009. Between 2009 and 2014, the share of high LTV mortgages spiked above 2 per cent in only three quarters but has gradually increased over the past five years.

December 2020 The share of mortgages advanced in 2020 Q3 with loan to value (LTV) ratios exceeding 90% was 3.5%, 2.4pp lower than a year earlier (Chart 3). Back to December 2019, ( A year is a long time in Confidence Land.)

Dan White, director at Champion Hall & White, thought the mortgage price war was partly responsible for the increase in high LTV products. He said: “Customers will opt for 90 and 95 per cent mortgages more partly because the rates have come down so much. “I think lenders are more willing to lend at the level, too, although it’s more strict than it was in 2007. A consumer’s affordability and credit score have to be strong to get a 95 per cent mortgage.” Mr White added that lending at 95 per cent LTV was acceptable as long as lenders looked after their borrowers and were willing to offer their customers new deals, rather than expensive retention rates. But Sarah Drakard, independent financial adviser at Cruze Financial Solutions, said the high share of high LTV mortgages was “worrying” because the property market was “just not strong enough” to deal with the risks. She added: “People forget about the financial crash. A few years ago, my first-time buyer clients didn’t want to buy a property with small deposits as they thought it wasn’t the ‘safe’ thing to do. “But now people are perhaps struggling to save, or parents are less willing to give money in unpredictable political times, so less people are able to save for big deposits.”

There’s more to house prices than interest rates BankUnderground Financial Stability, International Economics 03 June 2020 7 Minutes Lisa Panigrahi and Danny Walker https://bankunderground.co.uk/2020/06/03/theres-more-to-house-prices-than-interest-rates/ The average house in the UK is worth ten times what it was in 1980. Consumer prices are only three times higher. So house prices have more than trebled in real terms in just over a generation. In the 100 years leading up to 1980 they only doubled. Recent commentary on this blog and elsewhere argues that this unprecedented rise in house prices can be explained by one factor: lower interest rates. But this simple explanation might be too simple. In this blog post – which analyses the data available before Covid-19 hit the UK – we show that the interest rates story doesn’t seem to fit all of the facts. Other factors such as credit conditions or supply constraints could be important too. https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/uksectoraccounts/articles/nationalaccountsarticles/historicalestimatesoffinancialaccountsandbalancesheets

1.Foreword Authors: Ryland Thomas (Bank of England) and Louisa Nolan (Office for National Statistics). The financial crisis has re-emphasised the importance of tracking the financial transactions of different agents in the economy and how those flows affect their balance sheet positions and the build up of risk in the financial sector. The current financial accounts published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) only start in 1987 although historical estimates based on earlier systems of national accounts are available back to the 1950s. This article outlines some preliminary work undertaken by the ONS and the Bank of England, with the encouragement and help of external academic consultants1, to try and reconstruct historical financial accounts and balance sheets by institutional sector for the UK. It sets out the challenges of reconciling accounts from a range of sources, which were produced with different methodologies and classifications, giving some key examples. In addition, several historical datasets for financial accounts and balance sheets, back to 1920, accompany this publication. 2.Introduction – the value of understanding the past The recent financial crisis has highlighted the importance of monitoring financial transactions between different institutional sectors in the economy and how financial assets and liabilities are distributed across different sectors on their balance sheets. Recently the ONS and the Bank of England published a review of the existing set of sector financial accounts, including some initial estimates of “from whom and to whom” transactions, using data already available in the compilation of the financial accounts. But, as recently highlighted by Bjork and Offer (2013), the analysis of financial transactions in the economy often needs to be put in historical context especially when financial crises are rare events. In particular, econometric-based policy work benefits from the availability of long time series that span different policy regimes and cover periods of structural change in the financial sector. The current set of published financial accounts and balance sheets began in 1987. Older estimates of the financial accounts are available back to the 1950s, following the recommendations of the Radcliffe Report (1959) and growing interest in modelling the financial interdependence between sectors Roe (1973). Measures of national and personal sector wealth are available for even earlier periods. The current post-1987 dataset roughly covers a 30-year period when the UK financial sector was largely liberalised and free of direct financial controls following various reforms in the 1970s and 1980s. But the recent introduction of macroprudential policy in the UK and the need to understand how its instruments work has rekindled interest in how the more controlled financial environment of the 1950s and 1960s worked. During this period the authorities operated various policies that, at least superficially, bear some resemblance to the tools at the disposal of today’s macroprudential policy makers. The Bank of England’s One Bank Research Agenda, suggests there are benefits from understanding the financial system of the 1950s and 1960s as it may shed light on how macroprudential tools might operate. Historical data on financial accounts and balance sheets is a key part of developing that understanding. Section 2 sets out the historical development of the financial accounts and balance sheets in the UK. In Section 3, the challenges of reconciling a range of historical data sources, produced using different methodologies and classifications are discussed. Section 4 looks at some examples in more detail, and conclusions are presented in the final section.

https://bankunderground.co.uk/2020/06/03/theres-more-to-house-prices-than-interest-rates/ And here comes the No Shit Sherlock Moment! '

There could be a role for changes in credit conditions. The framework assumes that people are not credit constrained, meaning they can exploit arbitrage opportunities by buying up rental properties. If there are frictions in practice, this could mean that credit conditions matter for house prices. Mortgage debt expanded rapidly as house prices rose in the UK before the crisis, so this could be an important channel for the UK.

Institutional real estate investors, leverage, andmacroprudential regulation Manuel A. Muñoz 14 November 2020

Institutional real estate investment has more than quadrupled in the euro area since 2013, financed largelythrough non-bank lending, which is not subject to regulatory loan-to-value limits. This column uses a two-sectormodel of institutional real estate investors calibrated to quarterly data from the euro area economy to showthat optimised (countercyclical) loan-to-value rules limiting the borrowing capacity of such investors are moreeffective in smoothing property price, credit, and business cycles than the well investigated dynamic loan-to-value rules that affect (indebted) households’ borrowing limit. The findings call for a strengthening of themacroprudential regulatory framework for non-banks.

BUILD TO RENT !!!!

Utilising the Quantity Theory of Credit to Understand the Causes of the 2007 Financial Crisis Home » Educational resources » Sub-disciplines » Money, Banking & Finance © Copyright Maurice Starkey 2018 and available for reproduction under a Creative Commons CC-BY-SA license. Download this as a Microsoft Word document. Contents Introduction 1. Financial Deregulation 2. Credit money creation by banks and building societies 3. The Quantity Theory of Credit 4. Central Bank Policies to Manage the 2007 Financial Crisis 4.1 Should the Bank of England reduce interest rates in response to this type of financial crisis? 4.2 What type of quantitative easing is appropriate? Bibliography Footnotes https://www.economicsnetwork.ac.uk/archive/starkey_banking2

Banking crises tend to follow a period of rapid increases in asset prices (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). A substantial allocation of credit money creation for purchasing property and financial assets within secondary markets caused significant asset price inflation, which provided the context for the 2007 financial crisis (Werner R. A., 2013, p. 366). At some point the perception that assets may be over-valued influences investors’ perceptions of likely future price movements, and asset prices will fall when credit creation is no longer forthcoming for further asset purchases. This context produces a ‘Minsky Moment’ (Minsky, 1992). Falling asset prices cause speculators to lose money, and their loans will become non-performing because investors are unable to fulfil their contracted repayments. Banks have a relatively small capital cushion of around 10% of their asset base. Therefore, when the diminution in the value of a bank’s assets exceeds 10% it will cause the bank to become insolvent. Adair Turner (2017, p. 6) states: “The vast majority of bank lending in advanced economies does not support new business investment but instead funds either increased consumption, or the purchase of already existing assets, in particular real estate. Real estate is relatively fixed in supply, and consequently the transfer of funds to this sector leads to asset price increases that induce yet more credit demand and more credit supply, which is at the core of financial instability in modern economies”.

The outstanding value of all residential mortgage loans was £1,527.3 billion at the end of 2020 Q3

two thirds of households own the house they live in; half of these are still paying off their mortgage

28,536,000 Dwellings

29,180,071,800 sq ft 29 Billion Sqft .

Residential property price indices for Tokyo

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/276083416_Residential_property_price_indices_for_Tokyo Residential Property Price Indexes for TokyoErwin Diewert and Chihiro Shimizu1 Revised April 28, 2014Discussion Paper 13-07, School of Economics,The University of British Columbia,Vancouver, Canada, V6T 1Z1. Abstract The paper uses hedonic regression techniques in order to decompose the price of a house into land and structure components using real estate sales data for Tokyo. In order to get sensible results, a nonlinear regression model using data that covered multiple time periods was used. Collinearity between the amount of land and structure in each residential property leads to inaccurate estimates for the land and structure value of a property. This collinearity problem was solved by using exogenous information on the rate of growth of construction costs in Tokyo in order to get useful constant quality subindexes for the price of land and structures separately. The paper also shows how flexible depreciation schedules for houses can be obtained using sales data.Key WordsHouse price indexes, land and structure components, time dummy hedonic regressions, spline functions, flexible functional forms, Fisher ideal indexes, flexible depreciation rates. Walter Erwin Diewert 37.83University of British Columbia - Vancouver Chihiro Shimizu 20.94The University of Tokyo

How to Better Measure Hedonic Residential Property Price Indexes

Author(s):Mick SilverPublished Date:November 2016 I. Introduction A. The problems Macroeconomists and central banks need measures of residential property price inflation. They need to identify bubbles, the factors that drive them, instruments that contain them, and analyze their relation to recessions.2 Such measures are also needed for the System of National Accounts and may be needed as part of the measurement of owner-occupied housing in a consumer price index—see Eurostat et al. (2013, chapter 3). Timely, comparable, proper measurement is a prerequisite for all of this, driven by concomitant data. About property price statistics https://www.bis.org/statistics/pp.htm These statistics track developments in residential property prices (RPP) and commercial property prices (CPP) across the world via three data sets - detailed residential, selected residential and commercial. The selected residential property prices are harmonised as much as possible with recommendations in the Handbook on residential property prices, an internationally agreed framework for classifying property price issues. https://www.bis.org/statistics/pp_selected_documentation.pdf https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-manuals-and-guidelines/-/KS-RA-12-022?msg=mailSent http://www.acadata.co.uk/services/house-prices/ https://data.oecd.org/money/broad-money-m3.htm E. F. Schumacher From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia E. F. Schumacher Photograph of Schumacher from the cover of Small Is Beautiful, 1973 Born Ernst Friedrich Schumacher 16 August 1911 Bonn, German Empire Died 4 September 1977 (aged 66) Switzerland Education University of Oxford Columbia University Occupation Economist Ernst Friedrich Schumacher (16 August 1911 – 4 September 1977) was a German-British statistician and economist who is best known for his proposals for human-scale, decentralised and appropriate technologies.[1] He served as Chief Economic Advisor to the British National Coal Board from 1950 to 1970, and founded the Intermediate Technology Development Group (now known as Practical Action) in 1966. In 1995, his 1973 book Small Is Beautiful: A Study of Economics As If People Mattered was ranked by The Times Literary Supplement as one of the 100 most influential books published since World War II.[2] In 1977 he published A Guide for the Perplexed as a critique of materialistic scientism and as an exploration of the nature and organisation of knowledge.

#Fantastic #LSE report on #Affordable Homeownership @GenRentBook https://t.co/LMKKtFofjX https://t.co/spsr9Vq7t6 pic.twitter.com/ADZ6W0f1uk

— RealRLD (@rld_real_CPR) December 7, 2020

https://t.co/GZtP0RvFVI
I have been working on this series Chloe,#Moduloft's affordable Finance product should be available Spring 2021. Moduloft Affirdable Finance Framework of Understanding (First Draft Still Proof Reading) @financialeyes @JoeBlob20 @scientificecon @jbhearn

— RealRLD (@rld_real_CPR) December 9, 2020

https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/185SDeR-a_IW8zEt772mgHNtOfJtw1qmf?usp=sharing Spreadsheet with Data and Graphs. https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1REWkr2zubh60Dd8pg9_pr0XtGfsgZEJkCQoeRKXhgGs/edit?usp=sharing https://www.nobelprize.org/mediaplayer/?id=1996

The principles of tax policy by Dr. Adrian Wrigley (RIP) https://t.co/HqlkmajQTw via @rld_real_CPR

— RealRLD (@rld_real_CPR) December 10, 2020

https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmtreasy/memo/taxpolicy/m32.htm https://www.in2013dollars.com/uk/inflation/1751?amount=100 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bancor https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800916307510 Keywords Interest ratesEconomic growthMonetary policyMonetary transmissionPrices vs. quantitiesQuantity constraintsResource constraintsQuantity theory of credit

Our empirical findings reject the canonical view that interest rates somehow affect economic growth, and in an inverse manner. To the contrary, long-term and short-term interest rates follow the trend of nominal GDP, in the same direction, in all countries examined. This suggests that markets are not in equilibrium and the third factor driving GDP growth is a quantity – as shown by Werner, 1997, Werner, 2012a in the case of Japan (namely, the quantity of bank credit creation for the real economy - i.e., for GDP transactions, as the Quantity Theory of Credit postulates; Werner, 2013a). Herman Daly wrote in 1991: “Environmental economics, as it is taught in universities and practiced in government agencies and development banks, is overwhelmingly microeconomics. The theoretical focus is on prices, and the big issue is how to internalize external environmental costs so as to arrive at prices that reflect full social marginal opportunity costs. Once prices are right, the environmental problem is ‘solved’” (Daly, 1991, 255).

https://www.finder.com/uk/mortgage-statistics https://www.fca.org.uk/data/mortgage-lending-statistics https://www.bsa.org.uk/media-centre/bsa-blog/november-2020/ar-(1) https://www.housing.org.uk/news-and-blogs/news/national-housing-federation-launches-shared-ownership-campaign https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/market-studies/ms16-2-3-final-report.pdf https://www.joinstepladder.com/ https://www.perenna.co.uk/ https://www.wayhome.co.uk/ http://hampshirebank.org/latest-news/

Lagom/Förenas a new; complementary, federated, embodied energy, Currency. Peoples Republic of Dough. Ethereums Most important conversation Ever #Web 3 Embodied Energy Money. https://t.co/JSZYtN1Yjo via @rld_real_CPR

— RealRLD (@rld_real_CPR) December 10, 2020

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1057521915001477

Money its a Gas, used to be oil, but you still have your hands on my stash. Energy Economics. Banned from seeds. #WTF https://t.co/2wGlGHTBs6 via @rld_real_CPR

— RealRLD (@rld_real_CPR) December 10, 2020

Banks are intermediaries between Producers and Consumers.

It's too cumbersome for producers to lend directly to consumers, hence banks come in, take a cut for taking over the risk.

Only large corporations can lend directly to consumers.

— Kris □□□ □□ (@ektrit) February 19, 2020

And then came the Wolves. Jefferson and Franklin. Paper is Poverty. "If once they become inattentive to the public affairs, you & I, & Congress & Assemblies, judges & governors shall all become wolves." #ConquestofDough https://t.co/0pbbuKn3od via @rld_real_CPR

— RealRLD (@rld_real_CPR) December 10, 2020

http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~roehrigw/creutz/geldsyndrom/english/index.html http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~roehrigw/Welcome.html#english http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~roehrigw/onken/engl.htm https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributism https://distributistreview.com/archive/g-k-chestertons-distributism https://www.wrighthassall.co.uk/knowledge-base/how-will-the-rise-in-interest-rates-affect-the-construction-industry https://www.investopedia.com/financial-advisor/explaining-rising-interest-rates-and-real-estate-clients/ https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/knowledgebank/how-does-the-housing-market-affect-the-economy https://drive.google.com/file/d/1NYRyos2AjPspeJnAb4l-1UJ15CQIdt9C/view?usp=sharing https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/knowledgebank/how-does-the-housing-market-affect-the-economy Why is the housing market important to the economy? The housing market is closely linked to consumer spending. When house prices go up, homeowners become better off and feel more confident. Some people will borrow more against the value of their home, either to spend on goods and services, renovate their house, supplement their pension, or pay off other debt. When house prices go down, homeowners risk that their house will be worth less than their outstanding mortgage. People are therefore more likely to cut down on spending and hold off from making personal investments. Mortgages are the greatest source of debt for households in the UK. If many people take out large loans compared to their income or the value of their house, this can put the banking system at risk in an economic downturn. Housing investment is a small but unpredictable part of how we measure the total output of the economy. If you buy a newly built home, it directly contributes to total output (GDP), for example through investment in land and building materials as well as creating jobs. The local area also profits when new houses are built as newcomers will start using local shops and services. Buying and selling existing homes does not affect GDP in the same way. The accompanying costs of a house transaction still benefit the economy, however. These can include anything from estate agent, legal or surveyor fees to buying a new sofa or paint.

VALUE IS A NUMERICAL RELATION. Alexander Del Mar, The science of Money. #TheGrubStreetJournal #GrubStreetJournal #ConquestofDough https://t.co/nlByxLP00C via @rld_real_CPR

— RealRLD (@rld_real_CPR) December 10, 2020

https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/quarterly-bulletin/2014/money-creation-in-the-modern-economy.pdf

https://t.co/OKXaqq2kip

— RealRLD (@rld_real_CPR) December 10, 2020

I wrote this following bit in 2011.

Some people say a crash in house prices is necessary as a Valuer that has valued Oil refineries and Gas Terminals in another life I have one comment on that. There is a way of calculating the base market price on a real asset such as property the logical lower end price or entry price for property is not zero just as the maximum price must be related in some way to income multiples. ( my final year thesis for my degree was the Contractors Principle of Valuation for Taxation of Gas Terminals in Scotland, I had been employed by one of the Seven sisters. ) My very simple contention is that the basic price of a property in a market where there is no longer any activity.In a crashed or stagnant market supply and demand does not provide a Market price of comparable transactions in this situation the economic replacement cost of the property needs to be refrenced. This is a fairly easy thing to calculate there is a thing called Spons an almanac of prices/costs for the contracting world) that gives average building materials and labour costs for building. Today I would say £150 persqft would be a sensible price per square foot for a fairly traditional british house build there are cheaper ways and better ways to build but this is a first principles 101. The price of any property has a land element generally this is around 1/3rd of the total price any amount of sophisticated analysis will get you a variation around this figure and so on but the humble 1/3rd 1/3rd 1/3rd usually brings home the bacon so I’ll use it here so that then is £150 psft for the land element. Finally there is the last 1/3rd which is for the unknowns opportunity cost and profit. If we want to take the profit out again the maths to do that is easy but I’ll leave it as a 1/3rd for now. Right that gives a base cost pers sqft of £450 per sqft. For a more basic budget build one could argue for £100 per sq ft giving £300 pers sqft . Anyway if we say take £275 psf which is very low and in all probability below the actual economic replacement cost if you take a 750 sqft 2 bedroom apartment that would be a bottom line economic replacement cost value of £206,250. Regardless of anything people need somewhere to live in the future and an economic value has to be placed on production my question is this what policies going forward an banking system will support the proposition that every family should at least have a 2 bedroom family home and the cost of providing it would be roughly the figure I am suggesting if one factors in the opportunity cost for instance the government has lots of land it could contribute for free but its value still has to be recognised even if not charged for. These are open Market prices and assumptions but provision of housing has to be priced some way and I do plan to get into some analysis of the Affordable so called social housing side fo the equation as I say this is a first principles starting 101. I am going to develop this hypothesis further but just wanted to get it on paper going forward from this blog, in a melt down of the banking system and complete crash of the UK property market these first principles of economic replacement cost will be necessary to avoid a huge potential scam.

And Here we are now in December 2020 9 and a half years later. I have indeed been developing this Hypothesis further. Moduloft Finance Affordable Finance A Framework of Understanding (First Draft Still Proof Reading) #Moduloft The Concept. #Cop26 Draft No.1 Presentation and discussion #BuildBackBetter #LevellingUp #Moduloft The Concept. #Cop26 Draft No.2 notes Presentation and discussion #BuildBackBetter #LevellingUp #COP26 Presentation Embodied Energy, Embodied Carbon Building Information Modelling (BIM) Technical Framework Sourcebook https://www.yumpu.com/user/realrld

Mervyn King was Governor of the Bank of England from 2003 to 2013.

We chat for nearly two hours about uncertainty, financial instability, and what it means to be rational. Enjoy!

iTunes: https://t.co/iB9adpyE7q
Spotify: https://t.co/5p6RJ1X2qX
Website: https://t.co/pLFJuRM7lk pic.twitter.com/qbRMBlVjD3

— Joseph Walker (@JosephNWalker) August 8, 2020

I enjoy finding very smart people who challenge or disagree with me. Dr Nigel Stapledon is one such person. I first sought him out in June, and hunted him down again to share him on Real Vision.

I have a lot of respect for Nigel who built Australia’s long-run house prices index. https://t.co/FSCcPEvWFO

— Joseph Walker (@JosephNWalker) December 21, 2019

Or try some of these @TheKouk:

1. https://t.co/X7VH1GZ5G5

2. https://t.co/lE8fOz8g3N

3. https://t.co/jsMZ9DokGV

4. https://t.co/LciTaXoVQX

5. https://t.co/e3jySt0uRL

6. https://t.co/uTdYu8lQsM

— Joseph Walker (@JosephNWalker) October 25, 2019

Shiller's message has gone down under! https://t.co/wmgbNLJq13

— Bonnie Blake (@BonnieLBlake) October 3, 2019

I spoke with Nobel laureate @RobertJShiller about bubbles and Australia’s real estate bacchanalia.

iTunes: https://t.co/43jqRQ2ahu
Website: https://t.co/0ANgZeNiM0
Spotify: https://t.co/Y13mS1kmSb pic.twitter.com/XSGIGrhhmU

— Joseph Walker (@JosephNWalker) September 7, 2019

Must watch podcast with @John_Hempton and the @jollyswagmenpod. https://t.co/FZBVDHkJZl

— BalmyInvestor (@balmy_investor) July 8, 2019

3-hour episode with John Hempton goes out tomorrow (completely separate to my housing market conversation with him). It will be good — similar vein to my @AlderLaneeggs episode https://t.co/fCqkqGwM9K

— Joseph Walker (@JosephNWalker) July 7, 2019

Beautiful little paper on how a 1984-1990 house prices bubble rippled through Paris: a similar pattern to the Sydney contagion that @John_Hempton and I discussed in our podcast, though moving West-East in the Parisian case.

See left-hand chart:

(Source: https://t.co/tMutylOSve) pic.twitter.com/XDHY5dYlOg

— Joseph Walker (@JosephNWalker) July 3, 2019

In the Irish housing bust, Dublin residential property prices fell 59.1% in real terms from a February 2007 peak to a May 2012 trough.

During this period, prices recorded small increases in May 2008 (0.1%), August 2009 (0.1%), and August 2010 (0.5%).

(Source: @CSOIreland) pic.twitter.com/RMWcmLgQ6w

— Joseph Walker (@JosephNWalker) July 1, 2019

My key thesis on Aus housing is that speculators will flee.

The typical rebuttal I hear is: "Aus investors know to hold for the long-term."

But I suspect that is not so much a deeply-ingrained belief as a fragile post hoc rationalisation.

Eg. see this chart from Bob Shiller: pic.twitter.com/Yc026Zy1nZ

— Joseph Walker (@JosephNWalker) May 30, 2019

Must listen..... https://t.co/CXK9LrBBIf

— Grant Williams (@ttmygh) May 20, 2019

The @John_Hempton episode should require a paywall it’s that good...but all it costs is a review on iTunes. https://t.co/aOsUJQd6b6

— Mathew Casey (@matcasey) May 27, 2019

Even if you think that this weeks announcements on easing the APRA lending criteria will be good for prices, you owe it to yourself to review #housingbubbleweek and listen carefully to each interviewee. https://t.co/gpJjmlfiCR

— Mark Beveridge (@marks_thinking) May 25, 2019

The great irony of (Father of the EMH) Eugene Fama's denial of bubbles is that his beloved Chicago has the most orgiastic history of real estate speculation of any US city.

The 1830s saw a classic real estate bubble, but there was also the early-1870s, late-1880s, 1920s & 2000s. pic.twitter.com/A0o87pI50c

— Joseph Walker (@JosephNWalker) May 24, 2019

Friends, just so you know: I usually include fairly detailed show notes with timestamps and links to research. You’ll find them on the website (https://t.co/9dOsXjqePg) or in the episode info on Apple podcasts.

If you’re interested in the topics, you’ll find some great info pic.twitter.com/2zP6TqJPBI

— Joseph Walker (@JosephNWalker) May 20, 2019

Ep #5!
I had behavioural macroeconomist Timo Henckel around to the pad in Sydney for some wine and bubbles — of the financial variety.

I hugely enjoyed this chat. We discuss bubbles, upward sloping demand curves, and investor contagion. Enjoy!

iTunes: https://t.co/LNEAD5KN9U pic.twitter.com/xERUfTS2Xe

— Joseph Walker (@JosephNWalker) May 19, 2019

At ~59min of #housingbubbleweek episode #4, @cjoye gives @JosephNWalker an exclusive about why he thinks 15-20% national house prices falls loom if Labor wins power this Saturday.

(For the record: Joe thinks price falls will be >20% regardless.)

iTunes: https://t.co/6lkmO9BSF1 pic.twitter.com/VWxdUracL2

— The Jolly Swagman Podcast (@jollyswagmanpod) May 16, 2019

Episode #3 of #housingbubbleweek!

Joe speaks with renowned social scientist Timur Kuran about a new way to conceptualise housing bubbles: https://t.co/e271nsEu3J

— The Jolly Swagman Podcast (@jollyswagmanpod) May 15, 2019

We all know that real estate is the best long-term investment for capital gains, and investors should just hold through the ups and downs of the market. Right??

Piet Eichholtz created the Herengracht Index, the world's longest house prices index.

iTunes: https://t.co/ts9PR8tpov pic.twitter.com/BS7XFIoE2T

— Joseph Walker (@JosephNWalker) May 14, 2019

Joe kicks off #housingbubbleweek with a bang!

Dean Baker joins the pod for an excellent one-hour conversation on what exactly enabled him to see the US housing bubble when the rest of mainstream economists were blind. https://t.co/pBeYaVc7y2

— The Jolly Swagman Podcast (@jollyswagmanpod) May 13, 2019

Housing Market Fundamentals including Debt. From Shiller’s Irrational Exuberance to The Covid19 Debt Bomb.#COP26 Moduloft Primer. Primer INDEXED UNITS OF ACCOUNT: THEORY AND ASSESSMENT OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE, Property Values and Indexation #Moduloft The Concept. #Cop26 Draft No.1 Presentation and discussion #BuildBackBetter #LevellingUp #Moduloft The Concept. #Cop26 Draft No.2 notes Presentation and discussion #BuildBackBetter #LevellingUp #BuildBackBetter Part 2 #WEF #4IR "La réforme, oui. La chienlit, non ! " Moduloft on Money 25-35 95% and 5 x joint incomes Research into Mortgage origination risk analysis Full Outline FInal , With Executive Summary _Bumper Sticker._Loft Miles_ Shared Ownership Mind Map.outline.docx (1) #AbiogenicClimateChange #Scarcity #MoneyandPlan #Whathavetrotskyistseverdoneforus #FUD EDITION #GrubStreetJournal

FUD Edition Grub Street Journal Money, INDEXED UNITS OF ACCOUNT: THEORY AND ASSESSMENT OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE Robert J. Shiller Yale University the textbooks have long said, has three attributes: it is a medium of exchange, a store of value, and a unit of account. As a medium of exchange, it is a physical object or account balance that passes from person to person when items are bought and sold. This role is very important because it eliminates the need for ordinary barter, which is an inefficient means of effecting trade as it requires discovering a double coincidence of wants. The store of value function of money allows people to store purchasing power between transactions, which allows them to transact more efficiently, even though money is not the primary medium for long-term storage of value. This function is central to the cash-in-advance theoretical literature in monetary economics. The third function, the unit of account, is that prices are quoted in money units. https://web.archive.org/web/20171201050927/https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6360154.pdf https://josephnoelwalker.com/71-markets-and-the-madness-of-crowds-robert-shiller/ INDEXED UNITS OF ACCOUNT: THEORY AND ASSESSMENT OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE Robert J. Shiller Yale University https://web.archive.org/web/20171201050927/https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6360154.pdf https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unidad_de_Fomento https://web.archive.org/web/20050624021820/http://www.leavittbrothers.com/pdfs/housingbubble.pdf MONDAY, JUNE 20, 2005 The Bubble's New Home By JONATHAN R. LAING YALE ECONOMIST ROBERT SHILLER delivers his forecast for U.S. housing with a scholarly diffidence that only slightly mutes his stark message: The market is in the throes of a bubble of unprecedented proportions that probably will end ugly. Such unsettling talk is cheap, of course, especially from a tenured academic, and many sources, including Barron's, have wrongly predicted housing's downfall several times in the past few years. But the Ivy League professor's forecasts of coming trouble have been right before. His best seller Irrational Exuberance, predicting a bear market in U.S. stocks, hit the bookstores in March 2000, less than a week before the Nasdaq began a dizzying descent from above 5000 that would destroy 75% of its value in a little over 2½ years. THE EMPERORS NEW CLOTHES, RUSSEL BRAND https://www.imdb.com/title/tt4323536/ Director: Michael Winterbottom Writers: Russell Brand (made by), Michael Winterbottom (made by) About The film contains archival footage from the 21st-century recession paired with "comedic send-ups" from Brand, conducted in the financial districts of London and New York.[1] In one scene in the film, Brand attempts to confront Lord Rothermere, the billionaire owner of the Daily Mail, about his "non-dom" tax status, through which he avoids paying taxes in the United Kingdom by claiming residence elsewhere. When Brand rings the bell at Rothermere's London mansion and asks through the intercom to speak to him, he is told by an unseen person that Rothermere does indeed live there.[2] THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF CARBON TRADING . BANNED PAPER CRITICISING CARBON TRADING #WRONGKINDOFGREEN Professor Clive Spash on the limitations of Emissions Trading Schemes. https://www.clivespash.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2010_Spash_Brave_New_World_NPE.p https://longhairedmusings.wordpress.com/2019/07/21/153-one-for-the-sceptics-free-will-or-determinism-the-climate-religion-rowsons-perspectiva/comment-page-1/#comment-4118 #153. One for the sceptics. Free Will or Determinism , The Climate Religion Rowsons #Perspectiva https://longhairedmusings.wordpress.com/2019/07/22/153-one-for-the-sceptics-further-discussion-the-climate-religion-rowsons-perspectiva-mathematics-of-climate-change-and-climate-change-alarmism-climatology-as-opposed-to-climate-politics/ FREE MARKET CAPITALISM: IT`S THEIR FUTURE, ” I HAD A BRILLIANT IDEA FOR 21ST CENTURY ECONOMICS ” March 21, 2019 LIVE STREAM AGENDA/QUESTIONS DIALOGUE WITH JOHN HEARNE. A LIVE STREAMED DIALOGUE ON MONEY, BANKING AND POLITICAL ECONOMY. “TINA” THE VILLAGE BIKE OR TEMPLE WHORE. LIVE STREAM DIALOGUE WITH JOHN HEARNE. A LIVE STREAMED DIALOGUE ON MONEY, BANKING AND POLITICAL ECONOMY. “TINA” THE VILLAGE BIKE OR TEMPLE WHORE. Running Order. John Bio Introduction. John is the Economics expert and it is His Brilliant Idea. What are his Ism ’s, Ist’s and Ologies? Are you a Monetarist? And what is that?Roger, intro brief. Ex Property Developer, Chartered Surveyor turned Hippy Anarchist. 2. Tag Crowds in the Running Order after first Video Introduction. 1. Economy, Economics 2. Money. Johns Tag Crowd Top 5. 3. 1. Economy, Economics, Economists. (19) 2. Government’s 12 3. Income. 9 4. private (9) 5. Management https://longhairedmusings.wordpress.com/2019/03/18/free-market-capitalism-its-their-future/ https://longhairedmusings.wordpress.com/2019/03/18/free-market-capitalism-its-their-future/ https://longhairedmusings.wordpress.com/2019/03/20/free-market-capitalism-its-their-future-i-had-a-brilliant-idea-for-21st-century-economics-a-live-streamed-dialogue-on-money-banking-and-political-economy-tina-the-village-bike-or-templ/ https://longhairedmusings.wordpress.com/2019/03/21/live-stream-dialogue-with-john-hearne-a-live-streamed-dialogue-on-money-banking-and-political-economy-tina-the-village-bike-or-temple-whore/ https://longhairedmusings.wordpress.com/2019/03/12/the-military-industrial-complex-and-brexit-a-hypothesis-eumilitaryunification-brexit-brino-jocox-annalindh-olofpalme-tina/ MONEY LENT TWICE Slide 21 Perpetual Debt Machine Paul Grignon http://www.moneyasdebt.net/ Money as Debt is a 2006 animated documentary film by Canadian artist[1] and filmmaker Paul Grignon[2] about the monetary systems practised through modern banking.[3] The film presents Grignon's view of the process of money creation by banks and its historical background, and warns of his belief in its subsequent unsustainability.[4][5][6] Subsequent Money as Debt videos include Money as Debt II Promises Unleashed (2009)[7] and Money as Debt III: Evolution Beyond Money (2011).[8] http://paulgrignon.netfirms.com/MoneyasDebt/MAD2016/essays.htm FIXING MONEY BETTER SOUND Out of the Memory Hole Fixing Money Sustainable Human Sustainable Human Subscribe 19,420 47,296 1,192 29 Like I dislike this About Share Add to Transcript Statistics Report Published on Jun 25, 2012 Comedian Louis C.K., Activist Peter Joseph, and Euro Co-Architect Bernard Lietaer break down and expose the big bad joke that is The Federal Reserve, with help from the self-incriminating former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and former Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Donald Kohn. "Our potential as humans is infinite-- let us not limit ourselves through the medium of exchange. It's time to wake up." - Bernard Lietaer For more information about Mutual Credit Systems, we recommend strongly the book "The End of Money and The Future of Civilization" by Thomas H. Greco Jr. Also, there is some good information at his website: http://www.reinventingmoney.com/ FAIR USE NOTICE: This video may contain copyrighted material. Such material is made available for educational purposes only. This constitutes a 'fair use' of any such copyrighted material as provided for in Title 17 U.S.C. section 106A-117 of the US Copyright Law. "We shall require a substantially new manner of thinking if mankind is to survive." ~ Albert Einstein Changing the way we think is the most difficult and necessary challenge for our species right now. It's like the old adage that says that "fish don't know they're in water." They're so surrounded by it that it's impossible for them to see. The water is like our ways of thinking. The assumptions we make about life have been so reinforced throughout our lives that we have difficulty seeing them. Yet our survival as a species depends us making the choice to understand, develop, and live from a new manner of thinking. This channel is dedicated to exploring and sharing these new ways of thinking. Support us on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/sustainablehuman https://notthegrubstreetjournal.com/2017/08/06/the-paper-aristocracy-from-william-111-to-the-present-day-william-cobbett-against-gold/ TIDES OF THE DOLLAR MOON https://longhairedmusings.wordpress.com/?s=tides